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 SHERRILYN ROUSH
 TESTABILITY AND CANDOR
 In Memory of Robert Nozick
 ABSTRACT. On analogy with testimony, I define a notion of a scientific the
 ory's lacking or having candor, in a testing situation, according to whether the
 theory under test is probabilistically relevant to the processes in the test proce
 dures, and thereby to the reliability of test outcomes. I argue that this property
 identifies what is distinctive about those theories that Karl Popper denounced as
 exhibiting "reinforced dogmatism" through their self-protective behavior (e.g., psy
 choanalysis, Hegelianism, Marxism). I explore whether lack of candor interferes
 with the testing of theories, and conclude that (1) our default attitude toward
 theories that lack candor in a given test should be suspicion, but (2) the circum
 stance that a theory lacks candor in a testing situation does not preclude obtain
 ing independent evidence for the auxiliary assumptions to which the theory is
 probabilistically relevant, and thereby eliminating the problem that lack of candor
 creates. Thus, Popper was right to think that lack of candor is a bad thing, but
 wrong to conclude that candor is a criterion of the scientificity of a theory. See
 ing this requires recognition of some differences between intuitive relevance and
 probabilistic relevance, and proper appreciation of the notion of screening off and
 of the fact that probabilistic relevance is not transitive.
 Sometimes saying that a person was not candid with us is simply a
 muted way of saying that they were lying. However, uttering false
 hoods is not necessary for failing to be candid; in the most com
 mon usage, one fails to be candid when one fails to utter a relevant
 truth that one knows, especially a truth about one's own shortcom
 ings unknown to someone who may be adversely affected by them.
 One may flout candor if what one does say, even if true, positively
 diverts attention from salient truths or from the fact that they are
 being omitted. To be candid, it is not enough that the things one
 says are true. When we believe that someone has been candid with
 us, what we believe is that if there were truths important to us, that
 the person knows and that we should know, this person would have
 told them to us, or at least would not have taken steps to hide them.
 A person is candid if she has the disposition to say the (relevant)
 Synthese (2005) 145: 233-275
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 things she knows irrespective of whether their being known confers
 an immediate disadvantage on her. A person who is not candid with
 us often behaves so in order to protect herself, and possibly us, from
 the awkward consequences of the truth.
 I will not try to press this further into a philosophical analysis of
 the concept of candor in human life. Rather, I want to use the intu
 itive notion of a person's being candid to call attention to some spe
 cial problems about the testability of scientific theories. Most of us
 have given up the old project of defining testability as the property
 that makes scientific theories meaningful, and whose lack makes
 metaphysical propositions nonsensical. But regardless of its relation
 to meaning and language, the question of what makes a theory
 testable against experience remains a central issue for philosophy
 of science because of our interest in epistemic questions about how
 theories are justified. In this paper I will be concerned with stum
 bling blocks to testability that some theories face in virtue of what
 they claim about the world, and whether and how it is possible to
 overcome them. The type of problem I have in mind is something
 that caught the attention of Karl Popper when he described Hege
 lianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and philosophies of meaning as
 displaying "reinforced dogmatism," a phenomenon that he regarded
 as similar to "total ideology." This phenomenon, he thought, under
 mined the possibility of rational discussion, and represented a form
 of dishonesty.
 While Popper did not give a precise characterization of this phe
 nomenon, as far as I know, his comments on particular cases sug
 gest that he thought these theories were not unfalsifiable because of
 a lack of empirical consequences, but rather because they had fea
 tures that contributed in a different way to the theories' impervi
 ousness to criticism. Consider the theory of psychoanalysis in what
 I will call the 'cartoon' version. For this theory, the problem is
 not whether it leads to observable claims; it does. The problem, for
 example, is that according to the theory, a patient's denial of an
 analyst's accounts of her psyche is an indicator of repression, since a
 repressed patient is likely to resist admission of the repressed mate
 rial. But it is conceivable that the patient denies an account of her
 self not because of repression, but instead because the account of
 her as repressed is wrong and she knows it. Her denial would ordi
 narily be a potential falsifier of the account, but here according to
 the theory under scrutiny, this whole class of potential falsifiers?
 the patient's own testimony that an analyst's proposals about her
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 repressions are incorrect?could have their critical power defused
 because the theory offers an explanation of them that is flattering
 to the theory's point of view. It seems that we would have to deter
 mine whether the theory was correct before we could fairly deter
 mine whether a certain type of evidence counts as a falsifier of that
 theory or not, and that seems to put the cart before the horse if
 what we want is empirical testing.1
 What the theories Popper hated most have in common is?to put
 it metaphorically?that they have the capacity to protect themselves
 from empirical falsification, usually by means of what these theories
 claim about the way the world is. If we thought of a theory as a
 person, and asked what this self-protective behavior was analogous
 to, I think the closest notion would be a lack of candor. It is true
 that in testing theories what we are worried about is whether what
 they claim is true, not whether they tell us everything we want to
 know. It may thus seem that the question we should ask about the
 ories if we are comparing them to human beings is whether they
 are "lying" outright, not whether they are candid. But though we
 are indeed concerned with whether theories (or their empirical con
 sequences) are true, the apparent disanalogy between theories and
 candor just cited is due to the fact that our standard procedures
 for evaluating theories and people are slightly different. With peo
 ple we generally believe their testimonies unless there is an indica
 tion, even a small indication, that they are lying, incompetent, or
 joking. Fortunately we do not generally believe what theories say
 just because they say it. The standard procedure is to test the the
 ories. So the analogous questions arise about testimonies of people
 and tests of theories: 'Was that person's testimony candid?' is anal
 ogous to the question, 'Did anything about the theory (beyond the
 possibility that it makes no empirical difference) prevent that test
 of it from being revealing?' The idea is that the person, or theory,
 under scrutiny is making a contribution to the testimony, or test,
 by means of which we are trying to evaluate it, a contribution that
 could interfere with the worth of the testimony or test. The analogy
 is loose, and intended only as a heuristic: if it is not helpful, then
 think of 'lack of candor' as a placeholder for the notion that I will
 define precisely below.
 Popper thought the self-protective aspect he saw in some theories
 was a clear indication that they were not scientific, because they did
 not lay themselves open to rational criticism. I will not assume that
 self-protectiveness renders a theory unscientific, but rather develop
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 a view about why theories have the potential for the self-protection
 of which Popper so disapproved (and for other types of epistemic
 self-activity that he did not notice). It will then become clear that
 bona fide scientific theories may have this feature. This will show
 that lack of potential for self-protectiveness is not the straightfor
 ward criterion of scientificity for theories that Popper thought it
 was.
 Allowing that proper science contains self-protective theories
 should not come as a great surprise, since many of Popper's
 critics?Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Paul Feyerabend, for
 instance?have emphasized through their notions of paradigm,
 research programme, and opportunism that what we might strictly
 consider dogmatism is not foreign, and may be essential, to success
 ful science (Lakatos 1978; Feyerabend 1993; Kuhn 1996). But I will
 argue that there are ways of overcoming the epistemic problems that
 self-protective theories present, implying that such theories can be
 used to good effect in proper science, even in tests in which they
 are self-protective. This will show that it is not that truly scientific
 theories must lack the potential for self-protection, but that in good
 science a theory's potential for self-protection is well-handled.
 I wish to draw a sharp distinction that these and other authors
 do not always adhere to between the dogmatic psychological dis
 positions proponents of theories may have and the potentially
 self-protective features of theories themselves. The two kinds of
 dogmatism often have similar consequences, but their remedies are
 entirely different. In particular, if, as I will put it, a theory lacks can
 dor, then no degree of open-mindedness of disposition on the part
 of an adherent is alone likely to find, much less to solve, a problem
 that this may create. (Conversely, if a person is sufficiently dogmatic
 psychologically, then our overcoming the problems that may be cre
 ated by lack of candor in her theory may not make any difference
 to her beliefs.) In order to identify and understand what the content
 of a theory can contribute to difficulties in testing it, I am going
 to assume in this paper that the human handlers of a theory have
 the best possible intentions and behaviors. This will focus attention
 on problems that would exist regardless of scientists' virtue. So, for
 example, the problems with testing that I will be interested in will
 never take the form of a scientist accepting an auxiliary hypothesis
 just because it is the only way she can think of to protect her pet
 theory from disconfirmation.
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 1. WHEN DOES A THEORY LACK CANDOR?
 A test of a theory can fail to be revealing in many different ways.
 The accuracy of the instruments may be low, in measurement or
 otherwise. The test may yield false negatives or false positives. The
 test may scrutinize only an isolated part of a theory. The test may
 simply be botched. I will regard a theory as lacking candor only if
 the theory itself contributes to the test it undergoes being in some
 way nonrevelatory. A theory will contribute to any testing problem
 concerning it in the trivial sense that it is the theory's claims that are
 under scrutiny. To lack candor, in the intuitive sense, the theory will
 have to make an interfering contribution over and above this. The
 examples Popper was worried about make a contribution of the fol
 lowing form: the theory is probabilistically relevant to an auxiliary
 assumption about an instrument, process, or method that produces
 evidence used in the testing of the theory.
 A statement, Y, is probabilistically relevant to another, X, when
 the probability of X given Y is not equal to the probability of X,
 i.e., V(X/Y) 7?P(X). Intuitively, y's being so makes a difference to
 how probable it is that X is so. Y may be either positively or nega
 tively relevant depending on whether F(X/Y) > P(X) or V(X/Y) <
 P(X). This notion of relevance is distinct from, weaker than, and
 therefore fulfilled in a wider variety of cases than, logical relevance;
 Y and X are logically relevant just in case either Y proves X or
 refutes X or X proves Y or refutes Y. From here on, where I use the
 term 'relevance' alone, I will mean probabilistic relevance.2 When
 two statements fail to be probabilistically relevant they are said
 to be probabilistically independent. That is, X is probabilistically
 independent of Y when and only when F(X/Y) = P(X). Intuitively,
 whether Y is true makes no difference to the probability of X. In
 conformity with the fact that probabilistic relevance is weaker than
 logical relevance, probabilistic independence is stronger than logical
 independence.
 The condition I have stated in terms of probabilistic relevance is
 necessary for a theory to lack candor in the manner that I think
 Popper's examples do, but in ?2 I will combine it with another con
 straint in order to obtain a set of necessary and sufficient condi
 tions. I leave open the possibility that there are other ways than this
 for a theory to lack candor in the intuitive sense of protecting itself
 from testing or interfering with its testing. What I am defining now
 is only a notion that I think captures what is distinctive in Popper's
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 examples. Whether or under what conditions lack of candor is a
 problem and, when a problem, how it can be overcome, are ques
 tions I address in subsequent sections of this paper.3
 This necessary condition for lack of candor describes something
 that the cases Popper was exercised about have in common. (His
 cases also fulfill the refined condition of the next section.) The prob
 lem with psychoanalytic theory described above fulfills the condi
 tion exactly. The patient's testimony is one method for testing an
 account of a patient's psyche (and thereby, to some degree, a the
 ory of human psyches in general). However, according to psycho
 analysis (in the cartoon version I have described), what the patient
 professes may be discounted, under the rubric of 'denial,' if what
 she professes is a rejection of the analyst's theory. According to
 an opponent of that theory, the patient's own testimony, taken at
 face value, might be considered some of the most important evi
 dence against the theory. The theory is probabilistically relevant to
 this method of testing it, because what is happening in a testify
 ing patient, what helps to produce his testimony, is something about
 which the theory happens to make claims. This probabilistic rele
 vance makes it hard to imagine the patient's testimony as evidence
 whose import for this theory could be judged from any unbiased
 point of view.
 The caricature of Hegelianism that Popper commented on has
 a similar structure. The Hegelian supposedly thinks that there are
 contradictions in the nature of things, i.e., Hegel overcame Kant's
 antinomies by creating a system in which contradictions are toler
 ated. More charitably, we may say that Hegel thought contradic
 tions had to be tolerated in a true view of reality because reality
 was evolving. Even if the Hegelian does not think that granting the
 truth of one (or four) contradictions is committing oneself to all
 contradictions (and every other statement), his opponent will usu
 ally think this, because in the usual logic a pair of contradictory
 propositions implies every proposition. Thus if we believe, as Popper
 did, that "any criticism of any theory whatsoever, must be based on
 the method of pointing out some sort of contradiction, either within
 the theory itself or between the theory and some facts, ..." then
 Hegel's theory, which implies (according to Popper) that all con
 tradictions are to be tolerated, defuses all possible criticism of itself4
 (Popper 1989, 327; Popper 1966, 215). That is, if you believe the
 theory then you have grounds for regarding what are normally
 criticisms of your theory as unproblematic. Intuitively, this does not
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 seem to be a candid theory since it protects itself from criticism. It
 is also fair to say that something like the condition above holds: He
 gel's theory is relevant to, has something to say about, the method
 of testing that theory.
 An important difference between these two cases is that if
 Popper's claim about all criticism being based on contradiction is
 right, then Hegel's theory protects itself against all possible criticism,
 whereas nothing so global follows from the analogous admission
 about Freud's theory. A patient's direct testimony about a specific
 claim of the analyst is only one of the possible ways of probing
 the claims psychoanalytic theory makes about relations between, for
 example, repression and pathology. Adolf Gr?nbaum 's careful stud
 ies have argued persuasively that psychoanalysis is testable, indeed
 falsifiable, and that actual empirical tests have cast some doubt on it
 (Gr?nbaum 1984, 97-126). So even if we suppose with Popper that
 psychoanalytic theory cannot be tested properly via direct patient
 testimony about possibly repressed matters, it may be testable by
 other means, and apparently is. A tendency to self-protection in
 some test does not imply that a theory is untestable in general.
 Therefore, lack of candor should be defined in such a way that it
 is a local property, a property that holds of a theory only relative
 to some test or tests.
 Popper did have other sorts of complaints about psychoana
 lytic theory. For example, he thought that it was unclear just what
 its consequences were, and that the consequences it did have were
 vague. However, though these features adversely affect the testability
 of a theory, they should not limit the testability of an appropriately
 precisified version of the theory's claims. And, in any case, such
 vagueness could be present with a theory having any content at all,
 and thus is not distinctive of psychoanalysis and Popper's other spe
 cial targets. It may be, as Popper claimed of psychoanalysis, "prac
 tically impossible to describe any human behavior that might not
 be claimed to be a verification of [this theory]" (Popper 1989, 36).
 However, the truth of this claim would not be impressive, since any
 physical behavior might also be adduced to verify properly scien
 tific physical theories if we were prepared to postulate initial con
 ditions and auxiliary hypotheses at will to suit. Serious study of
 Freud's writings by a reader as critical as Gr?nbaum led the latter
 to conclude that Freud was not any more guilty of willful rigging
 than the typical physicist is. In order to show that there is a special
 problem with testing psychoanalysis, Popper would need to show
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 that there is a way other than willful rigging of auxiliary assump
 tions by which psychoanalysis can be made to fit any data. How
 ever, the only distinctive feature I can see in this or any other of
 Popper's examples of problem theories is the self-protective connec
 tion between theory and test-auxiliaries on which I have focused.5
 I am defining lack of candor for a theory in such a way as to
 allow for the possibility that a theory may lack candor in some tests
 and not in others, thus making this a local property. In such a case
 the theory is probabilistically relevant to the probing procedures
 used in some tests and not to those in others. Such mixed cases?
 like psychoanalysis on my cursory account?are the most interest
 ing because these theories may be empirically testable despite having
 a local tendency to self-protection due to the existence of a test
 type for which the theory is not candid. Any empirically testable
 theory could be a part of legitimate science. So there may be the
 ories among those we deem good science whose candor problems,
 and their consequences, have not been appreciated, and there may
 be theories among those we regard as evasive of criticism whose
 testability has been underappreciated due to excessive attention to
 the tests in which they are not candid.
 Whether a theory is candid or not is a question that can be
 answered only once a test procedure is specified.6 However, though
 a theory is testable in principle if there exists a test of it in which the
 theory is candid, and though this notion of testability in principle
 might suggest that we take an egalitarian attitude toward the pos
 sible tests, commitments and circumstances antecedent to or inde
 pendent of the theory may give a certain kind of test for a domain
 a privileged status at a given time (or indefinitely). For example,
 first person testimony tends to be accorded a privileged status for
 adjudicating claims about a person's psyche. Naked-eye observations
 of the heavens had a privileged status in astronomy at the time of
 Copernicus since they were the only observations of the heavens
 with demonstrated reliability. Galileo's argument about telescopes
 came later and was hard-won.
 The privileged status of a certain type of test in a domain may
 hide the testability of a theory from us if the theory is not candid
 for that test. Thus, ironically, one of the arguments Copernicus
 developed to show that his proposed new theory of the heavens
 should not be regarded as absurd also suggested that the new theory
 might be untestable by the standards of the day. Copernicus noticed
 that if you supposed that for some reason we would not feel the
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 motion of a moving earth, then naked-eye observations of the daily
 rotation of the heavens would not be decisive against his idea that
 the earth moved. That is, the appearances in the sky would be the
 same, roughly speaking, with heavenly bodies appearing to rotate,
 whether it was the earth or the heavens rotating (Copernicus 1952,
 I, 5). This implies that the Copernican hypothesis of heliocentrism,
 understood as including a supposition that we would not feel the
 earth's motion if it did move, had not yet been tested by the obser
 vations that had been made, and this was Copernicus's point.
 However, the very same fact that suggests that the hypothesis had
 not been properly ruled out, also suggests that it could not be tested
 at the time it was being proposed, because the right kinds of tests
 to distinguish the two hypotheses had not been described or even
 considered, and even if they had, the naked-eye observation level
 of accuracy might not have been sufficient to carry out those tests
 decisively. It was also the case that the Copernican hypothesis was
 not candid for the test that he claimed failed to rule it out. The
 hypothesis implied something about the process of producing the
 data (observations) in the test that was crucial to the conclusion
 that the test did not rule the hypothesis out: it implied that even if
 the earth moved we would not feel its motion. Since it was evident
 that we do not in fact feel the earth moving, the observations avail
 able at the time would, of course, have ruled out the heliocentric
 hypothesis had it not been for this saving feature of the new idea, a
 feature which was not justified until long after Copernicus. A local
 candor problem can take on a global significance in certain circum
 stances, or at a given time: if the test in which the theory is not
 candid is the only available or acceptable test there or then, what is
 strictly speaking a local problem might as well be global.
 If a theory lacks candor, and this is a problem (a condition I
 have not yet explored), then the problem will be of such a charac
 ter that we can imagine the following consequence: advocates and
 opponents of a theory to whom only noncandid ways of testing
 that theory are available may have a hard time settling their dis
 putes, and may each feel the other side is begging the question. This
 is the kind of phenomenon Kuhn describes as happening when a
 scientific revolution is afoot. The root cause of the phenomenon I
 have described would not be psychological dispositions to bullhead
 edness, having different meanings in mind for key terms, or even
 the psychological property that human minds are not configured for
 holding two paradigms at once for comparison. Those are diagnoses
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 that have so far been offered for revolutions. Rather the cause would
 be a property of the particular theory in the test situations available
 at a given time: probabilistic relevance relations between the theory
 and test auxiliaries.
 Lack of candor in particular tests is a notion that gives an alter
 native gloss to some aspects of the notion of paradigm. When it
 seems as if a theory and its confirming evidence must be accepted
 all at once or not at all if a science is to proceed at a given point
 in history, it may be because the theory is relevant to the processes
 occurring in the test procedures by which it can be imagined to be
 tested. Such a situation would imply that the probability a person
 assigns to a theory has consequences for the probability that must
 be assigned to certain auxiliaries, consequences that are unavoidable
 if the person is to be rational. This gives a new meaning to the idea
 that a theory and the methods of probing to discover whether it
 is adequate are available only as a package deal, and suggests that
 what it is for a theory to be a paradigm is not always merely that
 we have an unflinching allegiance to it. Thus, candor problems of a
 theory might provide explanations different from Kuhn's for cases in
 which changing one's allegiance from one theory to another looks,
 at a given point in history, as if it must take the form of a conver
 sion experience.
 This suggests a possibility that will be congenial to anyone who
 fears that acknowledging the existence of revolutions in science
 will lead inescapably to relativism: it may be that revolutions, with
 insufficiently grounded changes of allegiance, do happen in science,
 but because a theory that lacks candor in some tests need not lack
 candor in all tests, research may genuinely vindicate a theory chosen
 by revolution through tests imagined only subsequent to the revo
 lution. It is often assumed that if a change of allegiance to a new
 paradigm is not fully legitimated at the time at which the change of
 allegiance happens, then it can never be legitimated, because once
 allegiances change all evidence is seen only from the new paradigm's
 point of view. Because lack of candor can be local while seem
 ing for a time as if it were global it is possible to imagine even
 tually overcoming the problems that lack of candor might create:
 often, later, new tests can be devised. Another feature of candor
 and its lack, as I have defined them, is important in underwrit
 ing this possibility: neither of these properties depends on our alle
 giances. Because the problems that lack of candor creates do not
 come from our "seeing things in a certain way" or our prejudices,
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 but from objective aspects of the theories and tests, it is possible
 to imagine solutions to these problems that do not depend on our
 "seeing" things in a new way, or on changing or splitting our alle
 giances either. I will not develop these suggestions further here, but
 will focus on questions about testability, and about the conditions
 under which lack of candor is an epistemic problem.
 2. WHEN IS LACK OF CANDOR A PROBLEM?
 Imagine a situation where we are testing a theory by operating an
 instrument in observing a phenomenon, or using a probe to mea
 sure a phenomenon, or using a device to detect a phenomenon. For
 example, in an accelerator experiment, we could be using a detec
 tor to observe events that will indicate the existence of a certain
 particle if that particle exists. The theory that we are testing will,
 in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions, make predictions about
 what the outcome of this experiment will be if the theory is true.
 For example, it will predict that the experiment will produce particle
 events of a specified sort with a specified frequency. If the obser
 vational equipment shows an outcome that matches what the the
 ory predicted, let us call such an outcome 'favorable,' and, if the
 outcome does not match, 'unfavorable.'7 We will have an epistemic
 interest not only in whether the outcome of the test was prima facie
 favorable or unfavorable to the theory, but also in whether the out
 come was reliable or not. That is, we will be interested in whether
 the outcome indicates what we expect outcomes of that sort to indi
 cate, which usually depends centrally on whether the observational
 equipment functions as expected. Thus, for a given outcome there
 are four possible ordered pairs of the foregoing two-valued features:
 Normally, we should discount pairings 3 and 4, since they were
 unreliable, and focus on pairings 1 and 2. Outcomes of type 1
 will tend to confirm the theory, while those of type 2 will tend to
 falsify it.
 TABLE I
 Pairings of outcome properties
 Pairing 12 3 4
 Outcome favorable yes no yes no
 Outcome reliable yes yes no no
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 What should we do in the special case where the theory in ques
 tion lacks candor in this test? Its lacking candor implies that there
 is probabilistic relevance between the theory and an auxiliary about
 an instrument, process, or method that produces evidence used in
 the testing of the theory. These auxiliaries will often include state
 ments that were used in drawing out predictions from the theory;
 some of them describe the test situation, for without knowing cer
 tain things about the testing situation we could not know what the
 theory implies about it. The auxiliaries would therefore have been
 used to determine what sort of outcome is prima facie favorable to
 the theory. They would help us decide things such as 'In this situa
 tion, the theory predicts ten blue events per hour and no red ones.'
 But many of these auxiliaries will have another function: help
 ing us to determine which outcomes are reliable ('reliability auxil
 iaries'). Many statements about the process (in the experiment) that
 produced an outcome will be relevant to whether that outcome was
 reliable. For example, most statements about how the particle detec
 tor works, and worked on the occasion of a particular test, will be
 relevant to whether observed events or absence of observed events
 means that there were or were not particles. In the most obvious
 kind of case, if the particle detector was not working as planned,
 then an absence of detected events is not an indicator that the
 sought-for particles do not exist.
 In a normal testing situation, lots of statements about the pro
 cess that produces the outcome will be probabilistically relevant to
 the reliability of the outcome. For example, optical theory will be
 relevant to the process that goes on in a light microscope, and will
 help us to determine of a given appearance whether it is an arti
 fact or not. However, light microscopes are often and fruitfully used
 to test claims about things other than optical theory. For example,
 we can use them to study living cells and organisms. In those cases,
 although there is a theory that is relevant to the reliability of the
 test process, i.e., optical theory, this theory is not the theory under
 test, and so no lack of candor arises.
 If the theory under test fulfills the first condition above for lack
 ing candor, then that very theory under test is probabilistically rel
 evant to some of the auxiliaries about the process that produced
 the outcome. This sounds fishy, but in analyzing its significance,
 one must proceed carefully. For example, we might expect that this
 situation makes the theory relevant to the reliability of the outcome,
 but it does not automatically do so. Probabilistic relevance is not in
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 general transitive. So probabilistic relevance of a theory to the pro
 cess used to produce outcomes can fail to produce a problem for
 testability in the following way: though the theory is relevant to the
 process that produced the outcome, and the process that produced
 the outcome is relevant to the reliability of the outcome, the theory
 is not relevant to the reliability of the outcome.
 However, in many cases the transitivity condition will be fulfilled.
 In those cases, the theory is probabilistically relevant to the reliabil
 ity of the outcome. I will take a theory to lack candor in a test
 situation if the theory is (1) relevant to an auxiliary about the test
 process in a test situation, and (2) (thereby) relevant to the reliabil
 ity of the outcome. With individually necessary and jointly sufficient
 conditions in hand for when a theory lacks candor, our question
 now is whether fulfillment of these conditions by a theory and a
 given test situation means that we should respond differently from
 normal to the outcomes of the test.9 The view I will defend here
 is that our default attitude should be to regard tests in which the
 ories lack candor with suspicion?in this sense, Popper was right?
 but that it is also often possible for us to find good reason to set
 that suspicion aside. I will discuss my reasons for the first claim in
 this section, and those for the second in ?3.
 One might think that it is just obvious that we should regard
 such tests with suspicion. If so, it is probably because of the thought
 that the intuitive relevance of the theory to the reliability of the out
 comes means that we will be forced to reason circularly when we
 take the outcomes as indicative of whether or not the theory is true.
 However, that the theory is intuitively relevant to the reliability of
 the outcomes does not imply that we will reason circularly in tak
 ing an outcome as either reliable or unreliable. It is logically possible
 that we believe the theory before accepting an outcome as reliable,
 and that that belief is relevant?in an intuitive sense?to the reliabil
 ity of the outcome, yet our belief in the theory is not the basis for
 our belief that the outcome was reliable. We may have another, inde
 pendent, belief that is the basis.
 This way of avoiding circularity even when there is some type of
 relevance between reliability of outcome and truth of the hypoth
 esis under test does not at first sight appear to be available when
 we think about the matter in terms of probabilistic relevance.
 Few doubt that positive probabilistic relevance of e to H is a
 necessary condition for e to be evidence (support) for H unless they
 reject altogether the project of representing evidence via probability
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 (though see Achinstein 2001; Roush 2004a). However, if we add, as
 many would, that e's being probabilistically relevant to H is suffi
 cient for e to support H, then the threat of circularity in cases
 where a hypothesis lacks candor seems acute. For if H is probabi
 listically relevant to the reliability of e, as we said it was in any case
 where H lacks candor, then the only thing that prevents H from ille
 gitimately boosting itself is failures of transitivity in which H is rel
 evant to e via the auxiliary, and e is relevant to H (directly) but H
 does not thereby get to boost its own probability.10 Failure of tran
 sitivity in such situations can happen, but it hardly seems common
 enough to engender confidence that we will always avoid circular
 reasoning with noncandid theories.
 One might respond to this conundrum in three different ways.
 First, one might deny that noncandid theories should be counted as
 evidence for themselves and reject the idea that positive probabilis
 tic relevance is sufficient for evidence. Second, one might embrace
 the conclusion that noncandid theories should count as evidence for
 themselves and maintain the view that positive (probabilistic) rele
 vance is sufficient for one claim to be evidence for another. Neither
 of these proposals seems especially attractive. The third broad type
 of response is to hope that there has been some misunderstanding in
 the derivation of this dilemma. Indeed, as I will argue in ?3, we are
 led into this dilemma only if we fail to appreciate some important
 details about how probabilistic relevance works, and how it is differ
 ent from intuitive relevance. Thus, as I will argue, there are factors
 in addition to failure of transitivity that explain why a theory's posi
 tive probabilistic relevance to an outcome's reliability (when the two
 are considered in isolation) does not automatically make that theory
 count as evidence that the outcome is reliable.
 Some will not be convinced that this third option is needed,
 because they are not convinced that lack of candor, or even cir
 cularity, is a problem. In order to explain why the second option,
 in which we maintain the positive relevance conception of evidence
 and stop worrying about lack of candor, is unacceptable, I need to
 move back a step and argue, in the remainder of this section, that
 our default attitude toward noncandid theories should be suspicion.
 In recent years some authors have strenuously argued that the wide
 spread presumption against tests in which there is relevance between
 a theory and an auxiliary used to test the theory, and even our
 squeamishness about circularity, are prejudices that should be given
 up. On this view as described by Harold Brown, we should consider
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 each case individually in detail before condemning any of this kind
 (Brown 1994, 408, 410). Hudson (1994, 605; 2000, 9-10) even thinks
 that a scientist's willingness to question the theory under test if
 untoward results arise will insure that what he calls "background
 dependence" in a test of the theory is wholly unproblematic:
 [D]espite the fact that one's observations are informed by a theory T, so long as an
 experimentalist is willing to question T, given untoward results, there is no need to
 be concerned about vicious circularity in one's testing procedure. The crux is the
 experimenter's attitude toward the testing situation, to wit, is she genuinely open to
 questioning the theory informing the observations? (Hudson 2000, 10)
 Hudson thinks that the right attitude makes even circularity innoc
 uous, so it seems that he would certainly think that the relevance
 relation I have indicated?which may or may not yield circularity?
 is unproblematic. I disagree with both of these authors. I will argue
 that in a situation where there is probabilistic relevance between
 a theory and auxiliaries used to test the theory, and nothing else
 is known, the relevance makes the test unrevealing (to an extent
 related to the degree of relevance) in every possible case. Thereby
 I will defend my view that our default attitude toward situations
 involving such relevance should be suspicion.
 Hudson may be thinking that we can trust untoward results if
 the theory has been assumed in producing them because if the the
 ory was assumed, the theory could only have been working in its
 own favor. If discontinuing results came through despite this force
 trying to hide them, then they must be indicative of the nature of
 things, or at least not due to the theory's own action. But even
 if this rationale is sensible, it does nothing to reassure us that we
 can trust favorable results in which the theory has been assumed.
 Indeed, if the theory is assumed and is thereby working in its own
 favor, then to that extent it is not possible to tell whether a favorable
 result is indicative of the way the world is or is a consequence of
 the theory's own prejudicial work. The experimenter's attitude can
 do nothing to console us about this, since it is a matter of the test
 not giving us information.
 Imagine the theory that Acme makes reliable, accurate clocks,
 and that you test this theory by sitting in a windowless room with
 one of their clocks, watching it. Suppose that there is no other time
 piece in the room. You sit and observe this clock for hours, thus
 losing any independent sense of what time it is, and all this time
 the clock continues to run apparently uniformly without stopping.
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 Obviously, although you have been given no indication that the
 clock is inaccurate, you also have no evidence that the clock is accu
 rate since you have no independent check on the time. You could
 assume as an auxiliary in your test that Acme makes reliable, accu
 rate clocks, and thus that since the clock had the right time when
 you went into the room it probably has the right time now too.
 However, this would be manifestly circular if the point of the exer
 cise were to test whether Acme produces clocks that maintain cor
 rect time. Notice too that having a good attitude does nothing to
 change this situation: a willingness to question the theory if unto
 ward results about accuracy of the clock arise is of no consequence,
 since untoward results will not arise. The fact that untoward results
 never actually arise in this test does not yield confirmation of the
 theory, and an inquirer's questioning outlook makes no difference to
 this.
 There is a further problem with Hudson's assurances, for nei
 ther untoward results nor toward results can be taken simply as
 "given"?as if they are missives straight from the nature of things?
 when relevance of the sort I am considering obtains, because
 whether the results are reliable, and therefore whether they should
 count, depends on matters to which the theory is relevant. With this
 kind of relevance we will find that in the default situation, to the
 extent that there is relevance between theory and reliability auxil
 iary, the possible test outcomes are unrevealing. This is so despite
 the fact that the work that the theory does in the test is not in every
 case in its own favor.
 The simplest, default situation gives us an argument that our
 default attitude toward tests lacking candor should be suspicion. In
 the default situation we know what the theory is, we know what
 test we are doing of that theory and what auxiliary assumptions are
 crucial to that test, and we know the test outcomes. Crucially, we
 do not know anything else that is probabilistically relevant to the
 outcomes, or to the auxiliaries to which the theory is relevant, or
 to the reliability of the outcomes.11 From this it seems to follow, in
 particular, that we do not have independent evidence for the auxil
 iaries to which the theory is relevant or for the reliability of the out
 comes, regardless of how we might make more precise the intuitive
 idea of independent evidence.12 The only reasons that we will have
 to believe in the truth of some rather than other auxiliaries relevant
 to reliability of the test outcomes will be reasons that include beliefs
 about whether the theory being tested is true; even if the probability
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 of the theory does not fully determine the probability of the aux
 iliary, it is the only thing that can affect the latter. Beliefs about
 whether the theory is true will be our basis for believing auxiliaries
 relevant to the reliability of outcomes if we have any basis at all.
 In this case our epistemic reasons will follow the probabilistic rel
 evance relations between the theory and auxiliaries relevant to the
 reliability of outcomes rather closely. Any increase or decrease in
 our estimation of the probability of the theory will translate imme
 diately into an increase or decrease (not necessarily, respectively) in
 our estimation of the probability of the reliability of the outcomes.
 This situation does yield intuitive epistemic circles, and their details
 are worth exploring.
 The fact that theory and reliability of the test outcome are prob
 abilistically relevant to each other means that the probability of the
 reliability of the outcome is sensitive to changes in the probability of
 the theory.13 The theory may be either positively or negatively rele
 vant to the reliability of outcomes. Consider the positive case, where
 two intuitive circles will emerge. Suppose we have a favorable out
 come. Is it reliable? The theory counsels us that it is, since the the
 ory is positively relevant to the claim that this outcome is reliable
 and we have no other information. (That is, the prior probability
 of the auxiliary is .5.) A favorable outcome that is judged reliable
 is more likely to confirm the theory (because more likely to count),
 than if the outcome had been judged unreliable. Thus, it looks as
 if in such a case the theory gets to boost its own probability by
 reinforcing outcomes confirmatory to itself. Importantly, this is not
 actually what happens probabilistically. Conformably to our sense
 that this is a kind of circular boosting that should not be allowed,
 the equations of probability keep track of and wash out double
 counting, and the actual upshot in such a case would be no con
 firmation or disconfirmation of the hypothesis from this evidence at
 all. This is because the only information that licenses counting the
 evidence is information that was already in the hypothesis. Probabil
 ity conforms to our intuitions here about circular reasoning.
 When we get an unfavorable outcome, the theory that is positively
 relevant to the auxiliary that says this outcome is reliable counsels us
 to count this outcome at face value. If an unfavorable outcome is reli
 able this decreases the probability of the theory a little because it is a
 discontinuing instance. If, as we are assuming, the theory is positively
 relevant to the reliability of the outcome, then if the probability of
 the theory decreases, the probability of reliability of the unfavorable
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 outcome decreases too. If the probability of the reliability of the out
 come decreases then the disconfirming force of the outcome on the
 theory decreases, raising the probability of the theory. It appears,
 then, that the theory will have a see-sawing cyclical effect on its own
 probability. Of course, this does not actually happen if we follow the
 probability calculus since, once again, the equations of probability
 keep track of double-counting, and no effect on the reliability of the
 evidence that came only from the theory would yield a confirmation
 or disconfirmation of the theory (change in probability of the theory)
 by that evidence.
 There are also two circles in case the theory is negatively relevant
 to the reliability of the outcome. Suppose a favorable outcome. The
 theory tends to decrease the probability of the reliability of the out
 come. The more unreliable a favorable outcome is deemed to be, the
 less chance that favorable outcome has to confirm the theory com
 pared to what it would have done had it been deemed reliable. If the
 theory is boosted at all then so is the claim that the favorable outcome
 is unreliable. If we kept going in this circle, it seems, all confirming
 power of the favorable outcome would be destroyed. In fact, the out
 come can have no confirming or disconfirming effect on the theory,
 but this obtains for a different reason: if the only information that
 tells us whether or not to count the outcome comes from the the
 ory, then it would be double-counting to let that affect whether the
 outcome gets to boost the theory, and the equations of probability
 automatically ensure that this does not happen.
 In case the theory is negatively relevant to the reliability of an
 unfavorable outcome, the theory will counsel against the reliabil
 ity of this outcome. The less likely that an unfavorable outcome
 is reliable, the less it will be counted as disconfirming a theory. In
 this case to follow the theory's advice would be to shield the the
 ory from disconfirmation on no recommendation other than that
 of the theory itself. Waxing anthropomorphic, we might say that it
 would be to allow the theory to engage in self-protection. The equa
 tions of probability conform to our sense that this is not kosher,
 for if the only information tending to show that a piece of evidence
 does not disconfirm a theory comes from the theory itself then it
 would be double-counting the theory to register this positively for
 the theory, and using the probability equations properly takes care
 of this without our thinking about it.14
 The first thing to notice from all of this is that a theory's
 relevance to the process producing the outcome would not always
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 serve the theory if we were allow the theory to affect its own con
 firmation. It is not the case that relevance always yields a propen
 sity to self-protection. The second thing to notice is that the effect
 a theory would have on its own fate is bad in every case from the
 point of view of someone trying to use this test to judge whether
 the theory is true. We cannot trust the favorable outcome in the
 case of negative relevance between theory and reliability of outcome,
 because the theory itself tells us not to do so. That is, even if we
 gave the theory the benefit of the doubt by assuming it, we would
 find that this outcome favorable to the theory should not be trusted,
 so the outcome should not be trusted. Because of epistemic circular
 ity, we cannot trust a favorable outcome in a case of positive rele
 vance between theory and reliability of outcome: the theory tells us
 that we should trust the favorable outcome, and it is our only rele
 vant source of reasons, so the theory would be our basis for tak
 ing something to be evidence for it. When the theory tells us not
 to credit an outcome unfavorable to it, we similarly cannot employ
 its advice without begging the question. On the other hand, in the
 default situation we are considering, we have no other way of judg
 ing the reliability of that unfavorable outcome, so we cannot rea
 sonably credit it either. This leaves us in a situation where the test
 tells us nothing. When the theory is positively relevant to the reli
 ability of an unfavorable outcome the effect of the theory on its
 own confirmation, if we allowed such an effect, would be oscillat
 ing, therefore undefined, and of no use, as we saw above. All of
 these epistemic judgments have counterparts in the fact that prob
 ability theory automatically washes out double-counting and would
 not allow a theory to boost or depress its own probability by boost
 ing or depressing an intermediate claim. Interestingly, though self
 protectiveness of theories has been noticed more often in examples,
 self-sabotage also interferes with testing a theory.15
 I do not claim that the stripped down scenario that I have
 called the 'default situation,' in which no information other than
 the relevant theory is available, is common or uncommon in actual
 science, though it seems to be possible. However, if other informa
 tion than what I allowed were available, the relevance relations I
 have considered would still obtain if the theory and the auxiliary
 were considered in isolation. If we did not know the import of the
 other available information we would not know whether it overcame
 the problems that I have associated with the relevance in question.
 Thus what I have just argued shows that if we discover probabilis
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 tic relevance between a theory and the reliability of outcomes of the
 procedures for testing it, then we should regard those tests with sus
 picion until it is shown how other available evidence overcomes the
 problem. This means that, contra Brown, we should not have a neu
 tral attitude toward theories that lack candor until we see the details
 of cases; we should regard theories that lack candor as guilty until
 shown to be innocent.
 3. CAN THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LACK OF CANDOR BE
 OVERCOME?
 In ?2, in discussing tests in which the theory under test is relevant to
 an auxiliary about an instrument or method involved in producing
 the outcome of the test (a reliability auxiliary), and thereby relevant
 to the reliability of the test's outcome, I assumed we did not have
 evidence for the auxiliary that was independent of belief in the the
 ory. If we did have independent evidence for the auxiliary, then the
 trouble that the probabilistic dependence between theory and auxil
 iary causes might be tempered, since the probability assigned to the
 auxiliary would not depend exclusively on the probability assigned
 to the theory, but would also depend on that other evidence. What
 must "independent evidence" mean for this to be so? Here our intu
 itions may balk. To say that a theory and reliability auxiliary are
 probabilistically relevant to each other (for probabilistic relevance
 is symmetric, so the theory's relevance to the auxiliary is recipro
 cated) is to say that the two are not probabilistically independent.
 How then could we have evidence for one that was independent of
 the other if being evidence is a matter of probabilistic relevance, i.e.,
 lack of probabilistic independence?
 The first thing to say is that even if being evidence for X is the
 same as being (positively) probabilistically relevant to X, that does
 not imply that being independent evidence for X implies being prob
 abilistically independent of something. There are notions of inde
 pendence concerning evidence, definable in probabilistic terms, that
 are not the same as probabilistic independence simpliciter.
 There are at least two plausible notions of independent evi
 dence for the reliability auxiliary that would allow there to be a
 kind of independent evidence even where there was not probabilistic
 independence between the theory and the auxiliary.16 The first is the
 notion of a claim being evidence for the auxiliary independently of
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 the theory. That is, first, the evidence claim e meets a necessary con
 dition for being evidence for the auxiliary A, and second, the effect
 of the evidence on the auxiliary is independent of the theory T.
 These conditions can be represented as follows:
 (1) P(A/*)>P(A),
 (2a) P(A/e.T) = P(A/e),
 (2b) P(e/A.T) = P(e/A).
 The first condition, which says that e is positively relevant to A,
 thereby says that e meets the popular requirement discussed earlier
 for being evidence for A. Conditions (2a) and (2b) are alternative
 (and inequivalent) ways of demanding that <?'s meeting this require
 ment for being evidence for A does not depend on T.17 (2a) says
 that T makes no difference to whether e raises A's probability. (2b)
 says that T makes no difference to whether A raises e\ probability.
 The probabilistic relations required by (2a) and (2b) are called
 'screening off relations. Z screens off Y from X if and only if
 P(X/Z) = P(X/Z.Y)^P(X/Y). In such situations, though Y may be
 probabilistically relevant to X when the two are considered in isola
 tion, and though Z does not change that fact, when Z screens off Y
 from X, assuming Z true renders that relation between X and Y, as
 it were, impotent.18 It is sometimes said that Z "shields" X from Y.19
 Moreover, if Z screens off Y from X, then according to a probabil
 ity function that assigns probability 1 to Z (effectively taking Z to
 be true), the relevance between Y and X is not merely shielded but
 nonexistent, since Y and X are not probabilistically relevant. In our
 case, the relation between T and A remains when the two are consid
 ered in isolation, but given the type of independent evidence we are
 discussing, either e screens off T from A, as in (2a), or A screens off
 T from e, as in (2b). Moreover, for a function P' for which Pr(e) = 1,
 P\A/T) = P'A), implying that with this function T is not probabilis
 tically relevant to A (equivalently, A is probabilistically independent
 of T), and for a function V" for which P"(A) = 1, V"(e/T) = P"(e),
 implying that with this function T is not probabilistically relevant to
 e (equivalently, e is probabilistically independent of T).
 These conditions for independent evidence can be fulfilled by a
 theory, reliability auxiliary, and test in which the theory and aux
 iliary are probabilistically relevant to each other (when considered
 in isolation). For an example that fulfills the conditions in the limit
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 as evidence accumulates, that is, as we approach examining all the
 instances relevant to the reliability auxiliary, consider the theory T:
 All fluids expand on increase of their temperature.
 Consider the test of T in which as we heat many fluids, we
 measure their volumes and take their temperatures with a mercury
 thermometer. One auxiliary hypothesis, A, that we want to assume
 about the instrument is obvious:
 Mercury expands on increase of its temperature.
 But T and reliability auxiliary A are obviously relevant to each
 other (considered in isolation) since the latter is a simple restriction
 of the former, assuming as we can from background knowledge that
 mercury is a fluid. Despite this, we can have evidence for the auxil
 iary that is independent of the theory (in the limit) in the sense just
 defined. Intuitively, this is because there are other ways of measur
 ing temperature than glass bulb thermometers that rely on volume.20
 We need to see how the notion of probabilistic relevance respects
 this idea.
 Consider as e the claim that the electrical resistance method of
 measuring says that the temperature of the thermometer is, say,
 72? now and was 62? five minutes ago (when the volume was seen
 to be smaller). Suppose these values match what the thermometer
 registered as its temperature at these times. Clearly this e is proba
 bilistically relevant to A, the claim that mercury expands on heating,
 at least on the assumption that the electrical resistance method is
 not so bad a method of measuring temperature that it gives random
 results, and the assumption that T has not been assigned a proba
 bility of 1 (which would make it impossible for anything to be evi
 dence for it). This shows that condition (1) is fulfilled. A moment's
 reflection also shows that condition (2b) is fulfilled in the same
 circumstances. The relevance of A to e is unaffected by whether T
 is true (i.e., A screens off T from e), because the only samples e
 refers to are samples of mercury, and A says about mercury every
 thing that T says about mercury. T is a wheel that doesn't turn any
 thing in the relation between e and A.
 Fulfillment of condition (2a) is a more complicated issue. The
 probability of the auxiliary A given the evidence e is to some extent
 unaffected by whether the theory T is true, assuming the electrical
 resistance method does not have random outputs, because e gives
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 some of the boost to the auxiliary that it could otherwise have
 gotten from the theory. However, since in this case the theory is not
 merely relevant to the auxiliary but implies it, the evidence e would
 have to raise the probability of the auxiliary to 1 in order fully to
 replace the effect of the theory and fulfill condition (2a). This is the
 most extreme kind of relevance there could be between T and A,
 and where the relevance was less extreme, condition (2a) would be
 easier to fulfill.21 But even in this extreme case we can see that in
 the limit where we witness, and therefore insert as V all instances
 relevant to A, we will approach fulfillment of condition (2a). Even
 when we are not at the limit, we can see in what way the evidence
 from the alternate method of measuring temperature is acting: so as
 to replace step by step the effect of prior assumptions about the the
 ory on the probability of A.
 Because it is possible for evidence to screen off the relevance
 between a theory and an auxiliary, it is possible for there to be evi
 dence that supports the auxiliary independently of the theory. This
 is a chief ingredient in overcoming the problem presented by lack
 of candor in a theory. A theory that is probabilistically relevant to
 a reliability auxiliary when the two statements are considered in iso
 lation, and which thereby lacks candor for the test in question, may
 cease to be probabilistically relevant to the auxiliary when more
 evidence is taken into account. Such a theory will cease to be prob
 abilistically relevant to the auxiliary, according to the probability
 function that results from taking that evidence into account, if the
 further evidence is such that it screens off the theory from the aux
 iliary.
 To see this clearly one must consider carefully an important
 difference in the ways that intuitive relevance and probabilistic rel
 evance get evaluated. When we ask whether Y is relevant to X in
 the intuitive sense, the default assumption is that we are considering
 the two statements in isolation. The assumption of isolation can be
 withdrawn, but this must be done explicitly by addition of a phrase
 like 'given that Z.' In this intuitive sense of relevance, T does not
 cease to be relevant to A when e screens off T from A, for example,
 because nothing has changed about the fact that T and A have over
 lapping subject matters, and the default procedure is to consider the
 two statements in isolation. It is quite otherwise with probabilistic
 relevance, where pains would have to be taken to express explicitly
 what considering two statements in isolation means. Since the con
 dition for probabilistic relevance between Z and X is that P(X/Z)/
This content downloaded from 131.179.158.12 on Sat, 27 Jun 2020 08:43:59 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 256  SHERRILYN ROUSH
 P(X), whether two statements are probabilistically relevant can only
 be answered once a probability function is specified. A probability
 function assigns probabilities to every statement in the language.
 The question, then, of whether Z is probabilistically relevant to X
 is the question whether the truth of Z would affect the probability
 of X when the given assignments of probabilities to all other state
 ments is taken into account. Thus, if we say that e screens off T
 from A, we are saying that in a probability function that assigns
 probability 1 to e, and probability 1 to the statement that the elec
 trical resistance method does not produce random outputs, T is not
 probabilistically relevant to A. That is, if we know e (and some
 thing about the electrical resistance method), T no longer fulfills
 the conditions for a theory to lack candor. (Note that on this par
 ticular point the analogy between people and theories with respect
 to their candor breaks down, for even if we find evidence indepen
 dent of a person's noncandid testimony which helps us to settle the
 matter testified to, that will not make the person seem any more
 candid.)
 The statement of this conclusion brings out the fact that the kind
 of independence of evidence I have just shown can be secured for an
 auxiliary even when testing a theory that lacks candor is not all that
 we could hope for. The conclusion is a conditional statement, and T
 ceases to lack candor only if we know e and something about elec
 trical resistance. Can we know e independently of Tl Put differently,
 while the screening off relations (1), (2a), and (2b) assure us that T
 does not affect the relevance between A and e, e will not actually
 boost A much unless e has a relatively high probability. Where does
 the justification for that high probability for e come from, and can
 it be had without making assumptions about Tl A can be confirmed
 independently of T only by something with screening off properties
 like those of e, but we've just pushed the question back one step
 because we can now ask how e is to be confirmed, and whether that
 can be accomplished independently of T.
 At first sight the prospects look grim. Notice that the assump
 tion that made e relevant to A, namely, that electrical resistance is
 better than random at measuring temperature, also made e relevant
 to T, since that made e verify an instance of T (to some degree). If
 e is relevant to T when the two are considered in isolation, then T
 is relevant to e when the two are considered in isolation, and there
 fore T is a candidate for acting as evidence for e. That is, e is evi
 dence for A independently of T, but is not itself probabilistically
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 independent of T when the two are considered in isolation (i.e., it
 is not the case that P(e/T) = P(T), if A is not assumed).22 This is
 actually required by the definition for screening off to obtain, but
 does it mean that we cannot know e independently of T?
 Intuitively we would probably say "no." After all, the intuition
 that says that e, the evidence for A, should be "independent" of T is
 met by our being able to know e without knowing T. We can know
 that the electrical resistance method of measuring says that the tem
 perature of the thermometer is 72? now and was 62? five minutes
 ago without knowing that all fluids expand on heating. From our
 ability to know e without knowing T, it does not follow that e is
 probabilistically independent of T. To take a simpler example, we
 may know an instance without knowing its generalization, though
 the two are probabilistically relevant to each other.
 Nevertheless, it remains to see whether probabilistic relevance
 respects our intuitions here, and if so, how. In the case described,
 we come to be confident of e and of its import for A because of
 investigations by and of the electrical resistance method of measur
 ing temperature, e itself is actually easy to verify without regard for
 the truth or falsity of T, because e is only a report of what the elec
 trical resistance method said. That is, we may conditionalize on e
 (assign it probability 1) because of inspection of an instrument, and
 the outcome of this inspection will not depend on the probability
 assigned to T. However, the import of e for A depends on electri
 cal resistance being a reliable way of measuring temperature, and
 here the intuitive worry about T acting as evidence for itself finds its
 technical counterpart. Call the assumption that electrical resistance
 gives a reliable way of measuring temperature '?,' in view of the
 way this assumption underpins the significance of e for A. E must
 be known if the condition P(A/e.T) = P(A/e) is to be fulfilled. Can
 we learn E without any regard for the truth or falsity of Tl
 Let us imagine that our electrical resistance apparatus does not
 take volume measurements on the two samples but rather identifies
 the samples by the time at which they are measured. (The mercury
 thermometer itself is our source of information about the vol
 ume of the mercury.) This is possible because neither the electrical
 resistance method of measurement of temperature nor the method
 of calibrating this method relies on information about volume.
 Temperature gets its qualitative meaning from sensations of touch
 and other phenomena (boiling, steam) rather than visual observa
 tion of volume changes. Establishing the quantitative scale is more
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 delicate, but this is officially accomplished by bringing substances
 to special qualitative states whose maintenance indicates constancy
 of temperature, e.g., the triple point of water, and extrapolating a
 scale between such points. We could calibrate our electrical resis
 tance method with this scale.
 If so, then reliability of electrical resistance as a measurer of tem
 perature is probabilistically independent of T, since electrical resis
 tance reports about temperature do not depend on volume or say
 anything about volume. Both T and E are probabilistically relevant
 to e and e is relevant to each of T and E when these terms are
 considered pairwise in isolation. However, even in isolation E and
 T are not probabilistically relevant to each other. This means that
 what lies at the basis of our ability to avoid circularity in cases
 like the one I described is a failure of transitivity of probabilistic
 relevance. Our confidence in the import of e rests on E, which is
 probabilistically independent of T, even when E and T are consid
 ered in isolation. This aspect of the situation shows that it is a wel
 come failure of transitivity, and the screening off relations discussed
 above, that make it possible to get independent evidence for an aux
 iliary even when the theory under test was not candid for the test
 when we imagined ourselves in the "default" situation. Because of
 the existence of such independent evidence the theory ceases to lack
 candor in the test.
 We started off noticing that we could have a belief Y that was
 intuitively relevant to statement X but not the basis for our belief
 in X, and doubting that the probabilistic relevance notion of evi
 dence could capture this situation, since to be evidence just is to
 be relevant on that view. However, as I have emphasized, intuitive
 relevance and probabilistic relevance often differ in cases where the
 background assumptions are not explicitly identified, because the
 two modes of evaluation have different defaults. This means that
 we will not get the right answers about what is evidence for what
 according to the positive relevance notion of evidence if we suppose
 that that notion of evidence uses an intuitive concept of relevance.
 What probabilistic relevance does follow closely, and thankfully so,
 is the intuitive notion of the basis of a belief. For example, if we
 said, as we did early on, that T is intuitively relevant to e but not
 the basis for belief in e or consequently for belief in A, the reason
 for that would be that E screened off the relevance between T and
 e, i.e., because when E is known T is not probabilistically relevant to
 e. Probabilistic relevance closely follows the notion of a basis.
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 Some readers may be reminded here of work by Salmon (1975) in
 which he identified the phenomenon responsible for the apparently
 anomalous cases that arise for a notion of confirmation that uses
 probabilistic relevance, cases first systematically catalogued by Car
 nap (1950). In these cases, for example, though a piece of evidence
 e confirms a hypothesis H and an auxiliary A, it disconfirms their
 conjunction, or though e disconfirms the disjunction of H and A it
 confirms each of H and A, and there are many other permutations.
 Salmon pointed out that in all of the cases the addition of the evi
 dence e changed the level or kind of probabilistic relevance between
 H and A.
 He noted further that it would not make sense to adopt a rule
 forbidding all situations in which addition of e changed the rele
 vance between H and A, because a standard kind of disconfirma
 tion scenario required such a change. In this scenario, H and A
 start out probabilistically independent, which Salmon regarded as
 ideal since we could then have a belief about A without that forc
 ing any particular stand on H. H and A also together imply e, the
 prediction the hypothesis leads us to expect. However, not-<? is what
 actually occurs. The occurrence of not-e means that H and A are
 no longer probabilistically independent because since they together
 imply e they cannot both be true in a situation where e is false;
 if one of them is true the other must be false, and vice versa. If
 it can be determined whether H or A is more likely to be the cul
 prit, then a falsification will have occurred. Thus there are scenarios
 where evidence changes the relevance relation between a hypothesis
 and an auxiliary, and far from objecting, we should rather applaud
 this feature.
 What we have in the case discussed at length above is another
 type of example in which we should applaud and not object when
 the addition of evidence e changes the relevance relation between a
 hypothesis H and an auxiliary A. In this type of case the addition
 of evidence e changes the situation from one in which H is prob
 abilistically relevant to a reliability auxiliary A to one in which A
 is probabilistically independent of H, i.e., neither is probabilistically
 relevant to the other, e is evidence for the auxiliary A in this case,
 not principally evidence for H, but the addition of e as evidence
 makes other evidence for or against H possible because it shields
 our belief about A from our prejudices about H, and thus allows
 us to count or discount putative evidence for or against H indepen
 dently of the influence of our prejudices about H. For this reason
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 it can be a step that precedes the case Salmon focused on, where H
 and A start out independent.
 The counting and discounting of putative evidence, recall,
 depends unavoidably on judgments about reliability auxiliaries. In
 Salmon's case the kind of auxiliary in question is what we might
 call a 'prediction auxiliary' because it is an assumption that must
 be made in order to draw out predictions from the hypothesis H.
 The two types of auxiliary assumption play distinct but broadly sim
 ilar supporting roles in the process of confirmation and disconfir
 mation: a prediction auxiliary should be independently confirmed to
 some degree in order for evidence that contradicts the prediction to
 impugn the hypothesis (and not the auxiliary), and a reliability aux
 iliary should be independently confirmed to some degree in order
 for an outcome it says is reliable to be taken to confirm or falsify
 the hypothesis, and in order for an outcome it says is unreliable to
 be taken to be of no consequence.
 There is another kind of independent evidence that it is possible
 to have when there is relevance between theory and auxiliary. In this
 notion we are interested in evidence for the auxiliary that is inde
 pendent not of the theory but of the evidence we have for the theory.
 This kind of independence promotes variety of evidence. The condi
 tions that must be fulfilled for this are:
 (3) P(A/e.ef)>P(A/e),
 (4) P(e/A.ef) = P(e/A).
 Suppose e' is the evidence we already have for our theory and e is
 the new evidence that we want to boost A independently of the first
 evidence.23 For this, we want (3)?that e makes A more probable
 than it would be without e even when e' is assumed?which ensures
 that e is evidence for A that is not redundant with e'. And we want
 (4)?that whether A makes the evidence e more probable does not
 depend on the old evidence.24 Condition (4) could also be described
 as saying that e and e' are independent of each other relative to A,
 a notion discussed by Sober (1989).25
 We might worry that when, as we now assume, T is relevant to
 A, these conditions cannot be fulfilled, for since e' is evidence for
 T it must be relevant to T, so how could it fail to be relevant to
 e, which, being evidence for A, is relevant to A? But note that in
 this worry we have assumed twice over that relevance is transitive,
 which it is not. If the relevance fails the transitivity condition in
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 either case, then e' will be (unconditionally) independent of e. Of
 course, though it is interesting that this is possible, this is more than
 we need to fulfill the conditions above which involve relative rather
 than unconditional independence. These conditions are fulfilled by
 our thermometer example above.
 To see this let er, our old evidence for the temperature-volume
 theory, be evidence we got, say, from volume measurements of
 hydrogen taken by us at a variety of temperatures verified by appeal
 to the black body method. Let e be the same evidence as above that
 confirms the working of the mercury thermometer (i.e., confirms
 A) by measuring the thermometer's temperature at various volumes
 by, let us say, the electrical resistance method. (Suppose it is also
 found that the temperatures that the thermometer reports match
 these electrical resistance readings of its temperatures.)
 Condition (3) is fulfilled because even if we are given that e'?
 temperature increases with volume for hydrogen?assuming that this
 mercury expands on an increase in its temperature according to the
 better than random electrical resistance method will make it more
 likely that our mercury thermometer is working as we think it is
 than that would be if we did not make the assumption. Condi
 tion (4) is fulfilled because when the auxiliary proposition that mer
 cury expands on heating is assumed, the fact that hydrogen expands
 on heating does not make a difference to the probability that tem
 perature has increased with volume, in line with the markings on
 our mercury thermometer, whatever difference the latter might have
 made without that assumption.26
 We could describe these ways of getting independent evidence for
 the auxiliary about the thermometer as engaging in a different test of
 the theory than the test with which we began. So instead of testing
 by measuring volumes and taking their temperatures via the mercury
 thermometer, we are doing a less informative test by restricting our
 focus to mercury and using some other method to decide whether
 indeed this mercury expands on heating. But we can also describe
 this as the test with which we began, in the sense of attempting to
 test the same claim, the theory about all fluids, with independent evi
 dence for the auxiliary added to the test. Of course, technically the
 addition makes it a different test than the one with which we began;
 addition of the electrical resistance evidence about the thermome
 ter implies fulfillment of the other set of conditions for independent
 evidence (1), (2a), and (2b) as well. We saw that fulfilling those con
 ditions made a formerly noncandid theory candid, and candor was
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 defined relative to a test. However, this distinction is minor compared
 to the main points: first, it is possible for a theory that is not can
 did for a test to become candid in an extension of that test by the
 addition of independent evidence. Second, there is a further kind of
 independent evidence, associated with variety of evidence, that it is
 possible to find for a theory that lacks candor.
 To return to the overarching questions about lack of candor, it
 is not only that there can be other tests one might perform on a
 theory that is not candid for the test with which one starts, as I
 suggested above is the case for psychoanalysis. It is also possible in
 principle to find evidence that overcomes the problem that lack of
 candor creates in the test with which one began. This makes it a
 different test, technically, but one is still following the same route
 of testing. Notice also that this has been shown without giving up a
 positive relevance notion of evidence. Since lack of candor is a mat
 ter of relevance, upholding a notion of evidence to which relevance
 is central has given the widest possible berth to the idea that lack of
 candor could create circularity in evidence: the idea that a noncan
 did theory will contribute to the evidence for that very theory. The
 fact that the results of this paper leave in place the positive relevance
 notion of evidence increases the force of the conclusion that though
 lack of candor in a theory will make testing it a challenge, it does
 not necessarily make this impossible.
 4. CONCLUSION: BACKGROUND INDEPENDENCE
 A number of people have thought about issues related to those
 that I have been discussing. Sometimes they have called the demand
 referred to earlier that "in testing a theory, one should use obser
 vations whose theoretical underpinning excludes the theory under
 test" the requirement of background independence (Hudson 1994,
 595). Two key problems have hobbled some of this discussion.
 One is the ambiguity of phrases like 'theoretical underpinning
 excludes... ' said of observations used as evidence, and its opposites
 in which observations are 'informed by theories' and 'presuppose
 theories.' The second difficulty is the mistaken assumption that there
 is a single question posed using these phrases.
 One axis of ambiguity in these phrases is the distinction between
 epistemic independence and factual independence. Observations
 that are 'informed by theories' pretty clearly seem to fail to be
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 epistemically independent of those theories, while observations whose
 'theoretical underpinning excludes' a theory seem to achieve this
 independence from the theory.27 This is because these phrases
 connote our grounds for believing the observation statements in ques
 tion. However, the phrase 'x presupposes y' has at least two common
 meanings, one of which connotes not relations between beliefs and
 reasons for beliefs, but relations between matters of fact: x presup
 poses y just in case in order for x to be true, y must be true, i.e.,
 just in case x entails y. (A probabilistic version of this, which would
 have to assume an objective interpretation of probability, would say
 that x makes y probable, or x increases y's probability, i.e., x is pos
 itively probabilistically relevant to y.) One epistemic reading of 'x
 presupposes yj the one that Sober had in mind when he claimed
 that "the theories under test cannot be presupposed by the observa
 tion statements that are used to test those very theories," has it mean
 something such as 'you can't know that x is true unless you already
 believe y9 (Sober 1999, 52).28 (A probabilistic version of this would
 say that you probably cannot know that X is true without knowing
 that Y is true.)
 It seems to me that the guiding question about independence of
 observations or experimental outcomes from the theories that they
 are used to test is epistemic. Tests are used to produce grounds
 for accepting or rejecting theories, and what we want to know is
 whether dependences, of whatever sort, interfere with that epistemic
 task.29 Dependence between matters of fact has entered the discus
 sion of these topics so far mainly unconsciously, through not paying
 sufficient attention to the difference between relations among mat
 ters of fact and relations between reasons and beliefs, or because
 epistemic dependence follows probabilistic relevance closely when
 the latter is properly understood, and probability can be interpreted
 objectively. In this paper I have distinguished the intuitive notions
 of basis of a belief and relevance between two statements from their
 probabilistic counterparts, and investigated how these two registers
 are related to each other. Only so were we able to understand how it
 is possible to overcome the epistemic challenge that a theory's lack
 of candor creates.
 In particular, we saw that observations may be factually depen
 dent on the theory under test, in the sense that the theory is
 probabilistically relevant to a reliability auxiliary when those two
 statements are considered in isolation, yet not epistemically depen
 dent on the theory under test if there is independent evidence
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 for the auxiliary. This is because the independent evidence screens
 off the relevance between theory and auxiliary, meaning that once
 that evidence is taken into account the theory no longer supports
 the auxiliary epistemically. Although the theory and auxiliary are
 not probabilistically relevant to each other once that evidence is
 taken into account, they remain probabilistically relevant to each
 other when considered in isolation (factually dependent). Thus,
 once the independent evidence is in, the auxiliary is epistemically
 independent of the theory, but this does not change the factual
 dependence between the two. If we fail to appreciate these distinc
 tions we cannot avoid confusion in discussing so-called 'background
 dependence.'
 We can now answer some questions about whether, under each of
 the plausible univocal meanings of the phrase, background indepen
 dence should be required in testing. Start on the conservative side of
 the spectrum of views, and consider Sober's criterion, under the first
 reading of 'presupposes' (which is not the reading that he intended).
 This says that a theory must not be presupposed by observation
 statements used to test it, and means that the theory and, I will sup
 pose, its logical consequences, must not be entailed by those obser
 vation statements. Must this criterion always be fulfilled? No. We
 see a violation of it in the thermometer example above. An instance
 of the theory that fluids expand on heating, namely, that this mer
 cury expands on heating, is entailed by the observation statement
 used above to test the theory, namely, that the temperature of the
 mercury thermometer is, say, 72? now, and was 62? five minutes
 ago (at times when its volume was greater and less, respectively).30
 This does not compromise the test. We have from the electrical resis
 tance method independent evidence for the claim that this mercury
 expands on heating. It is sometimes possible to have such indepen
 dent evidence despite relations of factual dependence between the
 things that a theory and observation statements used in testing that
 theory make claims about. We should reject this strong reading of
 the background independence criterion.
 Consider now the epistemic (and intended) reading of Sober's
 criterion: it must not be the case that in order to know the
 observation statements used to test a theory, you have to believe
 that theory (or part of it). This is clearly an improvement over the
 previous, but it still need not always be fulfilled. What if we are
 once again testing the theory that fluids expand on heating, but have
 access to one of the fluids whose temperature we are measuring for
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 only a brief time, during which the only instrument that interacts
 with it is the mercury thermometer? After losing access to the fluid
 and its condition forever, but retaining the thermometer and the
 reading we got from it, we realize that whether the reading of the
 thermometer reliably indicates temperature is not independent of
 whether the theory under test about the relation between temper
 ature and volume is true. To believe that the thermometer reliably
 indicates temperature requires belief in part of the theory under test.
 Bad news, but we know what to do: find another method of measur
 ing temperature that will assure us that the thermometer that had
 access to the fluid is a good measurer of temperature.
 This is a situation where, among the beliefs that we have to have
 in order to know the temperature of the fluid, is a belief about the
 temperature and volume of the mercury thermometer. However, the
 belief about the mercury thermometer is not the basis for our belief
 about the temperature of the fluid. It is an epistemic conduit but
 not a provider of grounds for our belief about the fluid's tempera
 ture. And the other method of measuring temperature provides all
 the grounds we need. So this situation fails Sober's criterion but
 qualifies as a good test. Sober's criterion can be improved to with
 stand this example by taking 'x presupposes y9 to mean that a belief
 in y is part of the basis for one's belief in x. In this form, I endorse
 the criterion in light of my discussion in ?2 of why lack of candor
 is a problem, and my subsequent discussion of how the problem of
 a noncandid theory can be overcome, which uphold the idea that
 the theory's role as basis for beliefs about the reliability of outcomes
 must be eliminated by evidence that screens off the theory and is
 available independently of the theory. Thus I endorse the claim that
 we should disallow tests whose observational outcomes (including
 reliability) cannot be known without using beliefs about the theory
 under test as a basis for our beliefs about the outcomes and their
 significance. Furthermore, we have seen that probabilistic relevance
 keeps track of those basing relations remarkably faithfully.
 Brown (1994) noted by an example that unfavorable outcomes
 are possible even when a theory has been assumed in the test of it
 as a basis for one's beliefs about the outcome of the test. However,
 Brown was mistaken in thinking that the issue about whether back
 ground dependence is acceptable is whether unfavorable outcomes
 are possible when the tested theory is assumed. Rather the issue is
 what any outcome of a test can tell us when the theory under test
 has had an influence on our construal of that outcome. The kind of
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 example Brown and Hudson have in mind when they say that the
 possibility of unfavorable outcomes makes a circular test acceptable
 must be cases where the theory under test is either positively or
 negatively probabilistically relevant to the reliability of that unfavor
 able outcome. We saw above that neither kind of test can be reveal
 ing if there is no independent evidence for the reliability auxiliary.31
 A possible counterexample to the stand I am taking against
 Brown and Hudson on this point may leap to mind. Did we not use
 Euclidean assumptions about the geometry of space to certify the
 working of the telescopes used to confirm Einstein's general theory
 of relativity?and thereby to refute the claim that physical space was
 Euclidean? Thus Euclidean geometry was a basis of our belief that
 the test indeed refuted the claim that geometry was Euclidean. All
 of this is (roughly) true, but this example does not favor Brown and
 Hudson. The reason we should believe that such a test was revealing
 is not that even when we gave the Euclidean theory an advantage by
 assuming it, that theory was refuted. Rather, the theory that needed
 to be assumed and the theory that was refuted were not the same.
 The theory that needed to be assumed was that Euclidean geometry
 is right at the scale of telescopes. The refuted theory is that Euclid
 ean geometry correctly describes space at a much larger scale. More
 over, the theories of space in competition in these tests agreed that
 Euclidean geometry was correct at the scale of telescopes, and that
 is why using Euclidean geometry as a basis for our beliefs about the
 test is acceptable: we only needed to use the part on which the rivals
 agree.
 The assumed theory, that Euclidean geometry is right at the local
 scale, was neither refuted nor in question in the test. Thus, although
 the theory under test, general relativity, makes the local Euclid
 ean geometry used in the test probable, and so is relevant to it,
 nevertheless since the theory that says space is Euclidean at the
 large scale is relevant in the same direction to the same degree as
 general relativity, the assumption that Euclidean geometry is right
 enough on the local scale can safely be made in the test as if we
 had independent evidence for it. It is a legitimate question whether
 that assumption is true, but not a question that this test is sup
 posed to decide. This illustrates that lack of candor of a given the
 ory in a given test may fail to be a problem for that test in another
 way: the test may be able to distinguish rival theories if the two
 theories are relevant to the reliability of the outcome in the same
 way, to the same degree. A test may be able to distinguish the
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 rivals if the matter about which the theories are not candid is not
 exactly the matter through which the test is designed to distinguish
 them.
 The latest version of Sober's criterion, which I just endorsed,
 does not take a stand on what kind of relations of dependence
 among things in the world lead to situations where epistemic inde
 pendence between observational test outcomes and the theory under
 test is lacking, but says that the latter is bad whatever has caused it.
 Consider next the requirement of background independence with a
 slightly different reading of the restriction against interdependence.
 This version of the requirement says that it should never be that the
 theory under test is probabilistically relevant to an auxiliary about
 the reliability of outcomes of the test, i.e., a theory must never fail
 to be candid for a test. We have seen that there are, in turn, two
 ways to read this requirement, one in which the probabilistic rel
 evance of two statements is considered in isolation, and the other
 in which that relevance is judged taking all background knowledge
 into account.
 On the first reading the requirement cannot be endorsed, con
 tra, perhaps, Popper, since two statements may be probabilistically
 relevant when considered in isolation but not probabilistically rel
 evant when independent evidence is taken into account. A theory
 may lack candor for a test in the sense that the theory is probabilis
 tically relevant to the reliability of outcomes when the two are con
 sidered in isolation, but if independent evidence for the auxiliaries is
 acquired, that probabilistic relevance literally disappears. The other
 way of reading lack of candor, that it obtains only when the theory
 is probabilistically relevant to the reliability of outcomes all things
 considered, allows us to endorse a prohibition against noncandid
 theories, because a theory will fail to be candid in this sense only
 if there is no independent evidence for the auxiliaries. Both points
 cohere with the earlier argument that our default attitude toward
 theories lacking candor in a test should be suspicion, because if a
 theory lacks candor in either sense and there is no additional infor
 mation, then there is no independent evidence, and the lack of can
 dor has not been overcome. In this sense, Popper was right.
 Advocates and critics of the requirement of background inde
 pendence have both been both right and wrong. Critics have been
 wrong to conclude that "background independence is irrelevant to
 the prospect of gaining informative empirical data" (Hudson 1994,
 605). As I have argued above, there is a serious epistemic problem
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 if there is relevance between theory and (reliability) auxiliary and
 no independent evidence for the auxiliary. However, critics have
 been right to think that background dependence has been rejected
 too uniformly by methodologists, though the critics did not see the
 reason that they were right: background dependence does not make
 independent evidence for the auxiliary impossible, and it is that
 independent evidence that matters most. Advocates of background
 independence have been wrong to the extent that they issued a blan
 ket rejection of probabilistic relevance between theory and test pro
 cedures, probably wrongly thinking that probabilistic relevance (in
 isolation) made independent evidence impossible. But they have had
 sound intuitions that their critics did not about the dangers inher
 ent in circular testing, dangers that will be lurking whenever there
 is relevance between theory and reliability-auxiliaries and we do not
 know that we have independent evidence for the latter.
 To relate these results to circularity more precisely, we need to
 distinguish two different kinds of circularity in an argument or test.
 We often say that an argument is circular when the arguer assumes
 what she is trying to prove. But this formulation is ambiguous as
 to whether the assumption is merely believed or is also playing the
 role of grounds for the conclusion in this argument. In the first case,
 which I will call belief circularity, one believes some part of the con
 clusion before executing the argument, but that belief does not play
 the role of grounds for the argument's conclusion. In the second,
 which I will call justification circularity, one not only believes some
 part of the conclusion before executing the argument, but that belief
 is being used in the argument as a basis for the conclusion. The sec
 ond kind of circularity is obviously objectionable, whereas the first
 kind arguably is not. The notion of probabilistic relevance does very
 well in distinguishing the two, by means of the possibility of screen
 ing off relations, and because probabilistic relevance is not transi
 tive.
 When we speak of observations or outcomes of a test being
 laden with the theory under test, and we take this to be obviously
 objectionable, we are probably assuming that antecedent belief in
 the theory is producing justification circularity. Protesters would be
 right to respond that theory-ladenness might only cause belief cir
 cularity. But my argument above about what our default attitude
 should be toward a theory lacking candor in a test suggests that we
 should reply that the burden of proof is on the protester. It is not
 our burden to show that theory-ladenness is causing a problem, but
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 his to show that it is not. He must show that the given test does not
 involve justification circularity, usually by showing that independent
 evidence for the auxiliaries has been acquired.
 Franklin et al. (1989) challenged those who think that if observa
 tions are laden with the theory under test, that prevents a test of the
 theory. Could they come up with a workable example from actual
 science? Franklin et al. averred that they knew of none. They cited
 the thermometer case I have treated here as empirical evidence that
 theory-ladenness is not a problem, without explaining formally (or
 otherwise) why not. However, although they are right that this case
 does not present a problem, the thermometer case does not show
 that theory-ladenness with the theory under test is not a problem.
 Rather it shows that the problems introduced by theory-ladenness
 can in many cases be overcome by independent evidence.
 More generally, the results here imply that if there are not exam
 ples in actual science of tests whose circularity thwarts them, this
 does not count as grounds for thinking that a situation where evi
 dence is laden with the theory under test is unproblematic. The
 explanation of finding no examples in real science where circular
 ity thwarts testing could instead be that the only cases of circu
 lar testing that survive to be recorded in accepted scientific venues
 are those in which investigators have found independent evidence
 to overcome the problem. The investigators would have thereby
 transformed a test from one that would have been justification
 circular to one that was merely belief circular. On this view the
 difference between some scientific theories and theories like psycho
 analysis and Hegelianism would not be that one set of theories is
 honest and the other dishonest, but rather that though both sets
 possess a potential for "dishonestly" interfering with their own test
 ing, for the first set we have found ways to overcome that problem
 and for the second less so.
 To return to the analogy with candor in people, our situation
 with some theories in some tests is similar to the one in which we
 find ourselves when dealing with a person whom we suspect is not
 candid, and may even be lying. We have the option of pursuing evi
 dence that does not depend on believing what the person says, and
 that is not restricted in content to the topics that the person has
 decided to discuss. If we are lucky, we find such evidence. Finding
 such evidence may also require ingenuity, but it will not come as
 news that testing scientific theories requires ingenuity.
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 NOTES
 1 Note that there will be no problem if an empirical criterion can be given
 for distinguishing trustworthy from resisting denials. Psychoanalysis sympathizers
 tend to cite intensity of affect as a way of distinguishing a trustworthy denial
 from a resisting denial. (It is that Lady Hamlet protests too much, not that she
 protests at all, that gives her away.) On the other hand, could not intense affect
 in the denial be due to anger at the accusation (or felt incompetence) of the ana
 lyst, and so, be unrelated to repression?
 2 When I say that two statements are relevant intuitively I mean, for reasons that
 will become clear, to leave open whether they are probabilistically relevant in the
 technical sense.
 3 In making whether a theory lacks candor or not depend on its being proba
 bilistically relevant to test procedures, I seem to be setting up a hair trigger for
 theories to be deemed 'bad.' Probabilistic relevance comes in degrees and may
 be very weak: should we count a case of weak relevance as lack of candor? It
 should be counted as lack of candor because that relevance, though weak, will
 have the structure I describe below. It is likely to be insignificant if the relevance
 is weak, and in any case I will be showing how lack of candor can be overcome
 by revealing tests, so that the property need not be bad all things considered.
 4 Of course, Hegel might not think that contradictions as described are neces
 sary to criticism. (What about criticizing by offering an alternative explanation?)
 And it is not Hegel's or his theory's fault that Popper does think this. One may
 notice that Popper's argument implies that Hegel's theory protects from criticism
 not only itself but also every other theory that contains contradictions.
 5 Popper's charge just quoted is one of many examples where his accusations of
 reinforced dogmatism that seemed to indict a particular theory tended to become
 instead claims against the psychological dispositions of the theory's advocates,
 charges that could be appropriate against uncritical adherents of any theory. As
 I have said, such psychological or moral claims are not the interest of this paper.
 6 Sometimes propositions can be tested against their negations (e.g., Ts Ms.
 Smith pregnant or not pregnant?'), but often they cannot, and I am assuming
 that in the latter cases which other theory a theory is being tested against is
 part of what forms the context defining the test to which the theory is being
 put. When I say that a theory is testable, then, I imply that there is a salient
 rival hypothesis that it can be tested against in some test.
This content downloaded from 131.179.158.12 on Sat, 27 Jun 2020 08:43:59 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TESTABILITY AND CANDOR 271
 7 In this paper, to minimize complexity, I am going to be deliberately na?ve about
 judgments of whether an outcome was (prima facie) favorable or not. This will
 focus attention on auxiliaries involved in judgments of reliability of test proce
 dures. So I am assuming that from an outcome of an experiment we can know
 straightforwardly whether it was favorable or unfavorable to the theory. This is
 despite the fact that auxiliary assumptions are, of course, typically involved in
 those judgments too, because, as I have said, auxiliaries are involved in deriving
 a theory's predictions.
 8 The following nice example illustrating failure of transitivity of probabilistic rel
 evance is due to Richard Grandy. Let A be 'lives in Houston,' B 'is on a Rice
 soccer team,' and C 'is female.' Assume that our population is people in the U.S.,
 and that the male: female ratio in Houston is the same as it is in the entire
 U.S. Then A is (positively) relevant to B, B is "(positively) relevant to C since,
 as it happens, P(C/B) = \, but A is not relevant (positively or negatively) to C,
 because someone's living in Houston does not change the probability of that per
 son's being female from what it was by virtue of being a member of the U.S.
 population. The nontransitivity of probabilistic relevance can also be proven with
 a sandbox diagram. Draw a square to represent the universe of possibilities, and
 draw a horizontal line through the square to represent the separation of A's from
 not-A's. Draw a line through some point on the first line at a 45? angle (in either
 direction) from the first line, this to represent the border between the B's and
 the not-Z?'s. Now draw a line through the intersection of the first two at a 45?
 angle from the second line in the same direction as the second line was measured
 in, this to represent the border between C's and not-C's. In this representation,
 two properties are probabilistically independent if and only if their border lines
 are orthogonal. Notice that though A is probabilistically relevant to B and B is
 probabilistically relevant to C, A is not probabilistically relevant to C. The bor
 der lines of A and C are orthogonal because 45?+ 45? = 90?.
 9 The results below, and the responses we should have to them, would be similar
 if we took the auxiliary to be used to determine whether the result is relevant to
 testing the theory instead of whether the result is reliable. Some of my setup is
 similar to Hartmann 2001. (See also Bovens and Hartmann 2002.) I have gen
 eralized by adding a variable about the favorability of the outcome. Probabilistic
 relevance between theories and auxiliaries was also discussed in Roush 1999.
 10 Of course, H is relevant to H since everything is (maximally) relevant to itself,
 at least in the probabilistic sense of relevance, so there is a trivial sense in which
 H boosts its own probability. The question here is whether other relevance rela
 tions (via the auxiliary) are going to be such as to provide an additional route
 through which the prior probability of H will affect the posterior probability of
 H, so that the effect of the former on the latter will be illegitimate.
 11 I also assume that we do not know in the default situation whether the the
 ory's rival in this test is probabilistically relevant to the auxiliaries in the same
 direction to the same degree as is the theory. If the rival is so relevant, then the
 test will not seem unfair from the point of view of either rival. Whether such
 a test seems revealing or not in an absolute sense will depend on the particular
 subject matter in question in the auxiliaries and whether the assumptions that the
 two theories make about it are plausible independently of them.
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 12 At least, it follows on any view that takes positive relevance as necessary for
 evidence, since we are assuming that there is nothing relevant among our other
 beliefs.
 13 In what follows in this section I regard increase in probability automatically
 as confirmation and decrease in probability automatically as disconfirmation. In
 this respect the analysis depends on a notion of confirmation based on some rel
 evance measure.
 14 My claims in these last few paragraphs about what would happen probabilis
 tically are based on the obvious analogy of these circles to money pumps, which
 our beliefs will not be subject to if they conform to the probability calculus.
 15 Note that in developing these points I have not assumed that the theory con
 tributes to any deviation from the following conditions: P(rel/fav. T) = P(rel/7),
 and P(unrel/unfav T) = P(unrel/r), where 'fav' means the outcome is favorable to
 the theory, and 'rel' means the outcome is reliable. That is, I have not assumed,
 for example, that it is more likely for the theory to count an outcome as reliable
 if it is favorable, or more likely to count an outcome as unreliable if it is unfavor
 able. This would be a particularly devious feature for a theory to have. It seems
 possible that psychoanalysis, under my cartoon description, has this feature, but
 according to the current result a theory need not have this feature in order to
 interfere with its own testability. The probabilistic relevance I cited was enough
 to derive the uninformativeness of tests.
 16 I am not the first to have noticed that probabilistic independence and inde
 pendence of evidence are different notions, but there are several reasons why their
 difference deserves discussion here. One is that the distinction has often not been
 adhered to in discussion of realistic examples, as with the questions about test
 ability that Popper raises or general matters of testability, in philosophy of sci
 ence. Another is that it is only recently that attempts have been made to give
 formal accounts of the intuitive notion of independent evidence (see Sober 1989;
 Fitelson 2001). Finally, what has been done by way of a formal account until
 now has not treated the case where the hypothesis whose evidence is independent
 or not (from something) is an auxiliary, and where one of the things it should
 be independent from is the theory under test.
 17 (2a) should be read 'The probability of A given T and e is equal to the prob
 ability of A given e.' (2b) should be read 'The probability of e given A and T
 is equal to the probability of e given A.'
 18 Because if Z screens off Y from X then it follows that Z screens off X from
 Y, when Z screens off Y from X we can say 'Z screens off the relevance between
 Y and X.'
 19 'Shielding' was Hans Reichenbach's original term for what we now call 'screen
 ing off.'
 20 Temperature can be inferred by measuring the electrical resistance of materials,
 or by measuring the intensity of the maximum wavelength of emission of radia
 tion from a gas and knowing the identity of the gas, from which one can infer
 the temperature via a black-body curve. Of course, if these methods could be cer
 tified only by methods involving the increase of temperature with volume then a
 problem might remain. However, it seems that this is not so. (See what follows in
 the main text.) With these methods we may encounter the problem that we can
 not measure length independently of temperature, and we must measure a length
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 in order to measure the temperature. However, this is a different problem, which
 seems to be solvable. See Gillies 1972, 18-20.
 21 It is plausible that this strongest possible form of relevance, where the theory
 implies the auxiliary, will be the least common kind of relevance in actual cases.
 22 In other cases e could turn out to be independent of T while being relevant
 to A, which is relevant to T, because relevance is not transitive.
 23 I am assuming that what is evidence for T will be evidence for A, which will
 not always be fulfilled when T is relevant to A, even if we assume a positive
 relevance notion of evidence, since relevance is not transitive. However, in cases
 where there is no evidence for T that is also evidence for A, the question we are
 now addressing will not arise, since any evidence for A will be distinct from the
 evidence we had for T.
 24 Note that in the special case where e' is T, which occurs because T is rele
 vant to T, these conditions say that e is independent of T relative to A, which
 we also want to be true.
 25 Notice that I have not required that P(e/e') = P(e), an absolute independence
 between the two pieces of evidence. In this I follow Sober's (1989) point that in
 many common conditions we should prefer conditional to unconditional inde
 pendence between e and e' if we are looking to infer the state of a com
 mon cause of them. This builds on Reichenbach's earlier observation that joint
 effects of a common cause will not be unconditionally independent of each other
 (Reichenbach 1956, 159-160).
 26 Note that in case e is the only evidence we have?there is no e'?our intuition
 is that e provides the kind of evidence we need in order to trust our auxiliary
 in testing the theory. This is borne out in the second set of independence condi
 tions (3) and (4) because if e' is erased from them, the e that I have described
 fulfills the conditions.
 27 Curiously, Hudson, who uses both of these ideas in defining background inde
 pendence, accepts the requirement of background independence if it means an
 epistemic constraint (Hudson 2000, 6), but does not think that is what is meant
 by the phrases that he employs in the statement of the requirement of back
 ground independence, the requirement that he rejects. Since we are worried about
 epistemic grounds for drawing conclusions from tests, I do not see what else they
 should mean.
 28 This gloss on Sober's requirement comes from personal correspondence.
 29 Thus Peter Kosso is on the right track in attempting to define a notion of
 the independence of an account in his helpful (Kosso 1989). However see Roush
 2004b for improvements on his notion of evidence that is independent of the the
 ory under test.
 30 It may seem a gross abuse of language to call this an observation statement
 when as we have seen earlier our justification for believing it may depend on
 independent evidence about something as complicated as an electrical resistance
 measuring apparatus. However, a statement's being an 'observation statement'
 need not imply that it is known without recourse to other statements.
 31 For the same reason, a condition that Clark Glymour requires for evidence,
 namely, that "to test a hypothesis we must do something that could result in pre
 sumptive evidence against the hypothesis," is necessary but not sufficient for evi
 dence that is independent of the theory under test (Glymour 1980, 115).
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